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"THE TEDIUM OF IMMORTALITY"
Garth L. Hallett

The objection has often been made but has never, to my knowledge, been
developed that unending life, because unending, would be boring. I survey,
critique, and collate answers that have been or could be made to this objection: some mutually compatible, some not; some envisaging profound
changes within us (timeless existence, no sense of time, tolerance of sameness), some not. Together, they make a cumulative case: there are various
conceivable ways-neither clearly possible nor clearly impossible-in
which eternal life might surpass all present felicity without a touch of
ennui. Others may presently escape us.

Though tedium is one of the most commonly mentioned objections against
eternal life, I have discovered no halfway-thorough response to the objection. One reason, no doubt, is that the objection itself has received such
skimpy development. Even Bernard Williams's oft-cited critique, which is
lengthier than most, barely skirts the issue.
In "The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality,"
Williams identifies his title as that of a play by Karel Capek which tells of a
woman called Elina Makropulos, alias Emilia Marty and various other things
with the initials "EM," on whom her father, a sixteenth-century court physician, tried out an elixir of life. At the time of the action she is aged 342, and
her unending life, as Williams comments, "has come to a state of boredom,
indifference and coldness. Everything is joyless: 'in the end it is the same,'
she says, 'singing and silence."'1 For Williams, EM's state suggests that it can
be a good thing not to live too long. Indeed, on reflection her story suggests
something more than the mere possibility of such an outcome.
In general we can ask, what it is about the imaged activities of an
eternal life which would stave off the principal hazard to which EM
succumbed, boredom. The Don Juan in Hell joke, that heaven's
prospects are tedious and the devil has the best tunes, though a tired
fancy in itself, at least serves to show up a real and (I suspect) a profound difficulty, of providing any model of an unending, supposedly
satisfying, state or activity which would not rightly prove boring to
anyone who remained conscious of himself and who had acquired a
character, interests, tastes and impatiences in the course of living,
already, a finite life.'
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"Unending" and "supposedly satisfying"-the words indicate two distinguishable grounds of complaint that recur in this type of objection. In simple illustration, even if harp-playing was one's favorite form of entertainment, it might pall after a century or two. But for those who did not find
harp-playing so thrilling, it would grow wearisome a good deal sooner. So
the challenge, as Williams sees it, is to adduce a state or activity that would
be deeply satisfying and would be so even if eternally prolonged. Indeed,
in Williams's view, not only would it not suffice to suggest an activity or
state which might prove endlessly satisfying; "Nothing less will do for eternity than something that makes boredom 11l1thin/wble."3 And what could
that be? It is not unthinkable that even the beatific vision might eventually
prove boring, since the beatific vision itself is, in the pertinent sense,
unthinkable. Having set such a high standard, Williams makes one or two
attempts to reach it, then desists. Eternity can have no attraction.
Theologians, to be sure, have viewed things differently. Heeding
Jesus' or Muhammad's announcement of blessedness to corne, they have
recognized no need to prove that eternity will not be a bore, but instead
have envisaged ways in which eternal life might be as blessed as
announced. If their suggestions fail, they fail as plausible conjectures, not
as surefire prescriptions: This, then, is how I propose to assess them.
Treatments till now having been piecemeal, the time has come to ask: How
well do the varied answers respond to the tedium objection? What verdict
emerges from a comprehensive review of alternative solutions? Can any
verdict emerge beyond the recognition that "no eye has seen, nor ear
heard, nor the human heart conceived, what God has prepared for those
who love him" (1 Cor 2:9)?

1. Tota Simul Beatitude
According to Hans Kling, heavenly life is "quite different from the banalboring, temporal timeless life described in Max Frisch's Triptychon. It is
misleading to speak of 'after' death: eternity is not defined in terms of
'before' and 'after.' What it means is a new life, beyond the dimension of
space and time, in God's invisible, imperishab~le, incomprehensible
domain."s In this new state, many have suggested, Boethius's definition of
eternity as "the whole, perfect and simultaneous possession of endless life"
will, at least to some extent, apply to us. For the soul, too, "a thousand
years will be as one day, and one day as a thousand years. Its life has
become like to the divine life and hence knows no past or future but only
an ineffably happy present of intercourse with God."6 Time will not stretch
out endlessly, boringly. No tediously recurring events or cycles of events
will extend throughout eternity. All the fullness of a completely satisfying
existence will occupy a single now. 7
This most radical solution to the threat of boredom also appears the
most problematic. While many consider Boethian eternity an incoherent
notion, others invoke analogy to save it. For, though they cannot intuit the
inner coherence of such eternity, various considerations-divine
immutability, knowledge of free human actions, freedom from contingency, etc.-lead them to ascribe it to God. However, none of these consid-
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erations apply to human beings. And from the fact, extrinsically established, that timeless life is possible for God, it would not follow that timeless life is possible even for angelic creatures, much less for resurrected,
corporeal ones.
However, add the Incarnation as a further premise, and such an inference might seem legitimate. In The Logic of God Incarnate, Thomas Morris
has argued that our present condition does not define our possibilities
essentialistically, and that Jesus, being strictly, indiscernibly identical with
God the Son, possesses all the divine attributes, including eternity.8 If, then,
divine eternity is Boethian, and if Jesus is human as well as divine, it might
appear to follow that Boethian eternity is among our human possibilities.
This reasoning, however, has difficulties. For one, whatever may be true of
Jesus, the rest of us are not and never will be strictly identical with God.
For another, not even Chalcedon asserted the strict identity of Jesus with
God or God the Son, and such an identification does not, in fact, make
good sense. There remains, furthermore, the question of whether God's
eternity is or can be Boethian.
While recognizing the mystery in "simultaneous possession of eternal
life," John Baillie has argued that "it is not wholly a mystery. Not even our
human experience is wholly given over to temporality and successiveness."9
In illustration, he cites William James's much-quoted observation: "The
practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look
in two directions into time./1 10 What precludes extension of this straddling?
Again, with others Baillie invokes the purported words of Mozart:
And now my soul gets heated, and if nothing disturb me the piece
grows longer and brighter until, however long it is, it is all finished at
once in my mind, so that I can see it at a glance as if it were a pretty
picture or a pleasing person. Then I don't hear the notes one after
another, as they are hereafter to be played, but it is as if in my fancy
they were all at once. And that is a revel. While I'm inventing it all
seems to me like a fine vivid dream; but that hearing it all at once
(when the invention is done), that's the best. 11
How, we wonder, is such a thing possible? Even in the mind of a genius,
how can successive notes be heard "all at once"? And the puzzlement
spreads. If the notes were played, could Mozart still experience them "all at
once"? Could God? Could Mozart's mental experience be prolonged in
time, and if it could, would it prove endlessly satisfying? Could the
Jamesian backward-and-forward-Iooking experience be extended indefinitely backward and forward to form a single present? For us, could such a
timeless present suddenly commence at some moment in time? Is that a
coherent supposition? From whatever angle it is viewed, this first response
sets the mind in a whirl.
2. Heavenly Continuation

Whereas for Kling eternal life is "not a continuation of this life in space and
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time,"12 for others it clearly is. Notably, numerous Quranic verses promise
the faithful such delights as "gardens underneath which rivers flow,"
"purified spouses," "paiaces," "abundant fruits," "goodly dwelling
places," "immortal youths, going round about them with goblets, ewers,
and a cup from a spring."13 Such a portrayal evokes William James's
account of the idyllic summer sessions at Chatauqua:
You have perpetually running soda-water fountains, and daily popular lectures by distinguished men. You have the best of company, and
yet no effort. You have no zymotic diseases, no poverty, no drunkenness, no crime, no police. You have culture, you have kindness, you
have cheapness, you have equality, you have the best fruits of what
mankind has fought and bled and striven for under the name of civilization for centuries. You have, in short, a foretaste of what human
society might be, were it all in the light, with no suffering and no
dark comers.14
And yet, when James emerged into the dark and wicked world again, he
caught himself unexpectedly exclaiming, "Ouf! what a relief! ... This order
is too tame, this culture too second-rate, this goodness too uninspiring."ls
For James, making the culhrre first-rate and the goodness inspiring would
not suffice to make Chatauqua a satisfactory foretaste of heaven. What was
lacking, he surmised, was any element of risk, of danger. "At Chatauqua
there were no racks, even in the place's historical museum."lh Neither, no
doubt, will such things be found in heaven, to spice an otherwise humdrum existence.
In response to this Jamesian difficulty, Calvin Linton writes:
As to the irrationality of the popular view of the dullness of heaven, it
is instructive to ask what fruits of evil, as we see them displayed
before us rather vividly every day, will be so missed in heaven as to
generate there unassuageable nostalgia and unhappiness. Tending
the sick, fighting wars, enduring mental confusion and physical pain,
poverty and starvation, the ultimate hopelessness of death-are these
and hundreds of other conditions produced by sin so dear to us that
we cannot bear to think of living without them 717
Indeed, was the dearth of racks really James's problem? At least as
dulling, one suspects, as the absence of risky, life-and-death struggle was
the absence of any meaningful active involvement by James in the proceedings. He was not a lecturer, teacher, student, performer, or competitor, but
a spectator. One can therefore sense the relevance of Andrew Greeley's
suggestion that the life to come "will be filled with the excitement, the
wonder, the pleasures, the activity that makes life rewarding and exciting
here on earth."ls
Imagine your own heaven if you will. If it is to be a Christian heaven,
you can dispense with the Greek image of people sitting around
plucking musical instruments and not doing much else but look
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vapid. The Christian heaven is active, dynamic, vigorous. It is not a
place where life ends but rather a place where it continues. 19
The blessed, William Schneider agrees, "are protected from all risk of
ennui because they are always active, and their occupation, far from being
a burden, is most varied and delightful."20
Much activity, varied activity, exciting activity-and yet such assurances leave us wondering what kind of occupation or variety of occupations could still prove exciting after a million, billion, or trillion years. I
shall note three possible lines of response.

3. Unending Progress
Francis Newman observed that "to make a new life desirable it must give
us something to do, something worth striving for, and a career by which
we may improve in Virtue."21 To make the new life endlessly desirable,
some theorists of the hereafter extend the striving and the improvement
indefinitely. The blessed may be immovably attached to God, notes
Edmund Fortman,
But this need not exclude growth in an ever deeper awareness of
God's ongoing creative love, an ever greater growth in friendships
and fellowship, an ever greater growth in all fields of knowledge and
enjoyment. ... They can go on growing, doing, learning, loving, striving, achieving, each in his or her own way and at his or her own pace
and in the direction each wishes. 22
Sometimes such projections stress moral possibilities: "Because the other is
infinite subjectivity, the falling-in-Iove with love itself is progressive, and is
ever in process of achievement, involving continuous transformation of the
finite subject."2] Sometimes the conjectures stress intellectual possibilities:
"However perfectly the Blessed may know God's Divine perfections, there
will always remain infinitely more to learn. Though eternity is long, yet
even eternity itself will not be long enough for even the keenest intelligence among the Cherubim or Seraphim to measure the height and the
depth and the length and the breadth of the uncreated and eternal God."24
Though natural and seemingly appropriate, expressions such as these
veil a difficulty. "Height" and "depth" and "length" and "breadth"
sound quantitative. And such, it seems, they need to be, for the present
response to work or at least to be at all perspicuous. There must be endlessly more and more of God, to be matched with eternity, moment by
moment and eon by eon. Given the many paradoxes of quantitative infinity, one may wonder whether divine infinity should be so conceived. If
God is "immeasurable by any created mind,"25 is that because the measuring would have to be endless? As for the subject of all this growth,
one may wonder whether even elevated human nature will be endlessly
capax divini, morally, intellectually, or otherwise. So let us consider other
possible solutions.
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4. No Sl'11se of Time
"Eternity," writes A. van de Walle, "is in no way a prolongation of time.
Heaven is not worship that goes on for ever! Eternity is a particular kind, a
particular mode of being by which we transcend time, i.e. are no longer
subject to time."26 This sounds like the first response, noted above.
However, de Walle continues, "On earth we all know such experiences of
happiness, when we no longer have any sense of time." Though still in
time, we have no sense of its passing. In illustration, Lauren King remarks:
"Have you ever noticed a couple deeply in love? They can simply sit and
look at each other without a word. Suppose they could be frozen in one of
those ecstatic moments, to go on with no end and with no sense of passing
time. Would not this be 'heaven' to them? In the same way, we must
remember that heaven is not timebound. Time, and the sense of time, will
be swallowed up in eternity."27 Again, distinguishing this response from the
first, let us say that in ecstatic experience, time is swallowed up subjectively,
not objectively. And that, it seems, might suffice to preclude all boredom?8
It might, provided the experience was sufficiently absorbing to suspend
all sense of time's passing. The question is whether an experience could be
that engaging if endlessly protracted. I remember once losing track of time
when listening to a professional racconteur of Irish folk tales recite story
after story. I could hardly believe I had been listening for two hours!
However, had he started to repeat himself, the spell would have broken. So
it appears that the present suggestion gets us no farther than the preceding.
I might have enjoyed the tales whether or not I lost all sense of time, but I
would not have lost all sense of time had the tales not been so enjoyable.
And for that, they had to be new. Familiarity would have dulled their fascination.
The like might hold true even for experiences as exalted as the kind
Saint Teresa glowingly describes:
that cannot be told which [the soul] feels when our Lord admits it to
the understanding of His secrets and of His mighty works. The joy of
this is so far above all conceivable joys, that it may well make us loathe
all the joys of earth; for they are all but dross; and it is an odious thing
to make them enter into the comparison, even if we might have them
forever. Those which our Lord gives, what are they? One drop only of
the waters of the overflowing river which He is reserving for US. 29
The inexhaustible, everflowing river, we might add. Otherwise, as presently constituted, we might not experience forever the joy that Teresa
describes, of being admitted to "His secrets and His mighty works."
However, what needs to be questioned and seldom is with respect to the
tedium of immortality, is whether boredom with the familiar is either an
inseparable or a desirable aspect of human nature.

5. Eternal Youthfulness
As an adult, I would not want the story teller to tell the same tale over and
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over again (still less in identical words), but a child might."l And this
would indicate a deficiency not in the child but in me. Chesterton draws
the contrast with characteristic vigor:
A child kicks his legs rhythmically through excess, not absence, of
life. Because children have abounding vitality, because they are in
spirit fierce and free, therefore they want things repeated and
unchanged. They always say, "Do it again"; and the grown-up person does it again until he is nearly dead. For grown-up people are not
strong enough to exult in monotony.'l
"Strong enough" may not be quite the right phrase, but this is true: what
appeals to children a tenth time does not appeal to us adults a tenth time.
We tire more readily of the game, the story, the song. Eventually, we may
weary of a world as fantastic as this one, because it has grown familiar.
Indeed, we typically do, at least to some extent:
Heaven lies about us in our
infancy!
Shades of the prison-house begin to
close
Upon the growing boy.
Why this is so invites conjecture. Has evolution programmed us for lively then declining interest? (Compare the kitten and the cat.) Or do various
contrary influences smother the initial spark? Or is the spark always there,
ready to be kindled by anything new, but with less and less to kindle it in a
world where more and more has grown familiar? Whatever the explanation, we need only imagine ourselves experiencing all things-flowers,
fields, stories, people, seasons, symphonies, sunsets, games, elephants,
stars, hobbies, tasks, festivities-with the freshness of children, to take a
first, long stride toward heaven. Two further strides would take us there.
Imagine away all present pains and tribulations, then heighten our experiences and activities in ways such as those already suggested (for instance,
by Saint Teresa), and that would be heaven. Extend the experiences and
activities indefinitely, without loss of youthful appreciation, and that
would be Eternal Life.
So, is such an adjustment in our nature possible? Selectively, it may
already be realized. I think, for instance, of the fan who, when the musical
Cats closed on Broadway after a record run, had seen the show hundreds
of times. An aberration, 'perhaps, but not an unpleasant one. Closer to our
present theme is an experience like the following, of a person who previously could conceive no state of bliss that seemed proof forever against
boredom:
I cannot now recall whether the revelation came suddenly or gradually; I only remember finding myself in the very midst of those wonderful moments, beholding life for the first time in all its young intoxication of loveliness, its unspeakable joy, beauty, and importance. I
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cannot say exactly what the mysterious change was. I saw no new
thing, but I sawall the usual things in a miraculous new light-in
what I believe is their true light. I saw for the first time how wildly
beautiful and joyous, beyond any words of mine to describe, is the
whole of life.... It was not that for a few keyed-up moments I imagined all existence as beautiful, but that my inner vision was cleared to
the truth so that I saw the actual loveliness which is always there, but
which we so rarely perceive.32
r see no reason why this experience of twenty minutes might not continue
for many more, indeed indefinitely. It strongly suggests that boredom with
the familiar may not be an inalienable trait of human nature. I therefore
question Greeley's assertion, at least in part:
It is hard to imagine any kind of human life without surprises and

wonder. If we have lost the little child's capacity to delight in surprise, to be awed by the wonder, we have not become adult; we have
become aged and senile. The fullness of life requires a highly sensitive awareness of the possibility of surprise and a powerful capacity
for wonder. If life persistent is to be life at all, then it must be life
filled with surprises and wonder. 33
Eternity may be full of surprises, as the third response suggests; indeed, it
could hardly fail to be. But if familiar things can be experienced as freshly
and appreciated with as much wonder as when they were first encountered, the surprises need not continue endlessly in order to stave off satiety. I would therefore stress wonder more than surprises, as Rachel Carson
does in a memorable passage:
A child's world is fresh and new and beautiful, full of wonder and
excitement. It is our misfortune that for most of us that clear-eyed
vision, that true instinct for what is beautiful and awe-inspiring, is
dimmed and even lost before we reach adulthood. rf I had influence
with the good fairy who is supposed to preside over the christening
of all children I should ask that her gift to each child in the world be a
sense of wonder so indestructible that it would last through life, as an
Lmfailing antidote against the boredom and disenchantments of later
years, the sterile preoccupation with things that are artificial, the
alienation from the sources of our strength. 34
Were God, at a heavenly christening, to bless all newcomers with a sense
of wonder so indestructible that it would last through eternity, that gift
would furnish an unfailing antidote to boredom.
Richard Swinburne sees matters differently. Developing the third
response, he writes:
Most earthly occupations indeed pall after a time, but the reason why
they pall is that there are no new facets to them which a man wants
to have. And also most earthly occupations are rightly judged only to
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be worth a finite amount of interest, because there are not ever-new
facets to them which are greatly worthwhile having. A man who has
molded his desires so as to seek only the good and its continuation
would not, given the Christian doctrine of God, be bored in eternity."
It is clear from preceding remarks how this might be questioned.
Explaining why earthly occupations pall, Swinburne cites a single reason:
"there are no new facets to them which a man wants to have." He appears
to take for granted the accompanying reason, namely that people crave
newness. If we resembled children more, we might readily continue meaningful, enjoyable occupations without demanding "ever-new facets ...
which are greatly worthwhile having."

6. Creative Contentment
Swinburne's closing words about seeking "only the good and its continuation" open a different perspective, for our hunger for newness has another
source besides boredom with the familiar. An imperfect world cries out for
improvement, and improvement means progress, change-newness. There
is no end to what may be achieved, both remedially and creatively, for
human and global betterment. Thus staleness is not the worst defect of
sameness. Standing still means settling for less and accepting a very imperfect state of affairs. The further question must therefore be faced, whether in
a perfect state of affairs human beings would find existence meaningful.
What would there be to strive for?
One answer, sampled in response three, would suggest that heaven will
be negatively, not positively, perfect. New horizons of value will always lie
ahead. "What are the most worthwhile actions," asks Swinburne, "the most
worthwhile tasks to pursue? I suggest that they are developing our understanding of the world and beautifying it, developing our friendship with
others, and helping others toward a deeply happy life."" Such tasks might
continue in the world to come, but could they continue indefinitely? Would
they need to? True, with nothing further to achieve, the drive to achieve
might wither, and in this world, where there is a great deal to achieve, that
would be unfortunate. But suppose, in Swinburne's listing, that we understood the world fully, or as fully as we could. Suppose we had beautified
the world as fully as we could. Suppose we had developed friendships with
as many people as fully as we could. Suppose we had helped others to as
deeply happy a life as we could. In this hypothetical fullness of achievement, this limitless sea of perfection, would we regret the lack of further
worlds to conquer? Should we? If we shouldn't, doubtless in a world where
our desires had become fully attuned to reality, we wouldn't. The artist or
poet touches up this, touches up that, then says, "Leave it alone, it's perfect" -and rejoices in the result.
But forever and ever and ever? Yes, if fame meant nothing and work were
not an end in itself, homo Jaber might finally cease fabricating and simply
enjoy the party. "The kingdom of heaven," Jesus suggests, "may be compared to a king who gave a wedding banquet for his son." (Mt 22:2) God is
the host, Jesus the groom, and the whole heavenly court partakers in the cel-
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ebration. This biblical image suggests a different reading of Swinburne's
final "task" of promoting others' happiness. At a wedding feast, the host
makes people happy by inviting them to the party, supplying the wherewithal, welcoming them, making them feel at ease. The cook makes people
happy by preparing a delectable meal. The musicians make people happy by
playing festive music. The guests join in the merriment by dancing, singing,
conversing, telling stories, playing games, passing the hors d' oeuvres. Since
the participants are not building up knowledge, virtue, or the world, no limit
threatens beyond which they cannot progress. The banquet is an ongoing
affair and each person has a part, not only in the enjoyment but also in sharing the enjoyment. For eternity and eternity, "laissez les bons temps rouler!"
Thus Jesus' parable suggests em alternative to Swinburne's pragmatic perspective: "Only a task which made continued progress valuable for its own
sake but which would take an infinite time to finish would be worth doing
forever."37 Still, the parable is just a parable, not a precise, prophetic portrayal
of how things will one day be. As Stewart Sutherland has noted, "the greater
the detail, the fuller the translation of the hope for heaven, or utopia into the
hope that x, y and z, not to mention A, B and C will come to be, then the
greater the implausibility of the hope and the less likely it is to be widely
shared. illS Present at the Big Bang, who could venture details of the universe to
come? Observing planet Earth at its inception, who could imagine sequoias or
rhinos or string quartets? Gazing on a chrysalis for the first time, who could
surmise the many-splendored creature that would emerge? Repeatedly, no
eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the human heart conceived what surprises
God has in store. If, despite such reminders, someone wonders, "But won't I
be bored?" the aptest response may be, "Use your imagination."
That seems the best way to regard the "possibilities" here reviewed. None
of these alternatives-timeless beatitude, heavenly continuation, indefinite
progress, subjective timelessness, eternal youthfulness, creative contentment-is clearly possible and none is clearly impossible (though the first
comes close). Further, it is not clear in all instances which suggestions are
genuinely and not just conceptually compossible (here, again, the first suggestion poses most problems). Moreover, all six responses link closely with
the underlying question how and whether life beyond the grave, in this form
or that, is possible. However, the deeper the mystery, the less reasonable it
appears to assert that whatever form eternity might take would certainly
have to be boring. The "tedium of immortality" may not be "unthinkable,"
but neither, in the same sense, is full, unending blessedness unthinkable.
Here are half a dozen ways of thinking it. The first (timeless beatitude)
stands alone. The third (indefinite progress) complements the second (heavenly continuation) in one direction; the fourth (subjective timelessness), the
fifth (eternal youthfulness), and the sixth (creative contenbnent) complement
it in others. Together, all six form a cumulative case: there are various conceivable ways in which the life to come might surpass all present felicity
without a touch of ennui. Besides these six ways there may be others, lost in
mystery, that we do not or cannot conceive. The great mystics have
expressed no misgivings about the tedium of eternity with God. 39
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